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A. INl1RODUCTION
In 1989, most Eastern European countries  began changing  from centrally-planned  to
market-oriented  economies. Some countries  undertook  comprehensive  macroeconomic  reform
programs aimed at stabilizing  their economies  and introducing  market forces. Programs  typically
'.onsisted  of liberalizing  product markets, reforming  labor and financial  markets, and integrating  their
econoraies  to the world economy  by removing  trade restrictions. In addition, most countries privatized
their small-scale  state-owned  enterprises  (SOEs)  through public auctions  and a few countries  also
introduced  schemes  for restructuring  and privatizing  large state-owned  enterprises.
Although the experience  with macroeconomic  reform differs across countries, the most
successful  countries  managed  to stabilize their economies,  to liberalize  prices and introduce
competition,  ending  the goods shortages of centrally  planned  economies. 2 But few managed to
restructure and privatize  the SOEs or the banking  system. Yet both the .:'C)Es'  and the banking
system's restructuring and privatization  will have important  effects  on macroeconomic  stability. Their
postponement  could undermine  the governments'  ability to balance  the budget  and to pursue
non-inflationary  monetary  policies.
The introduction  of market forces made apparent the large number  of SOEs needing
restructuring and privatization. The magnitude  of the problem was not fully apparent before because
centrally-planned  economies  relied on price controls  and subsidies. Loss-making  SOEs continued  to
have access  to finance from the banking  system because  their closure would have had a substantial
impact  on employment  and could have halted the reform effort. Also policies to restructure, liquidate,
or privatize  these enterprises  are not yet in place.  This is undermining  macroeconomic  stability and is
endangering  the future of the well-managed  enterprises.  It is resulting in a perverse allocation  of
2  See Bruno (1992)  for a rmcent  critical macroeconomic  assessment ot the five more advanced  Eastem European countries (Hungary,  Po-
land, CSFR, Bulgaria and Ronania).Page 2
resources: loss-making  enterprises  are accessing  credit while the new emerging private sector is being
crowded  out.
A number of studies have analyzed  the problems  in restructuring  and privatizing  the SOEs by
focusing  on the enterprises' problems. This paper attempts  to analyze  the problem from the
perspective  of the banking  system. It seeks to understand  the role that the banking  system is playing in
the transition. It attempts  to understand  the starting conditions  and the governments' reform
strategies. The focus is on the institutional  aspects  of financial  sector reform, drawing on the
experien,.e  of the five more advanced  former centrallv  planned  Eastern European countries: Hungary,
Poland, the former CSFR, 3 Bulgaria and Romania.
Although  Eastern European  governments  made substantial  progress in reforming  their banking
systems, it still plays a passive role.  Few countries  have successfully  'ised their banking  systems as an
instrument  to accelerate  the supply response, for instance, by ensuring an efficient  credit allocation, or
by using banks to exert control on loss-making  SOEs.  Most banking  systems  are s.ill dominated  by
large state-owned  banks which hold a large proportion  of nonperforming  loans. Countries  that have
establihed new private banks, introduced  new regulation  and supervision, and enhanced  bank
competition  show an improvement  in the allocation  of credit and greater control of loss-making  SOEs.
The organization  of the paper is as follows. Section  B opens the discussion  with the analysis
of the legacies  of the past.  Section C compares  the policies adopted  by each government  for
restructuring the banking  system. Section  D compares  the efficiency  of the five banking  systems in an
attempt to assess the consequences  of the government  policies undertaken. Finally in Section  E the
conclusions  highlight  the lessons  that can be learnt from these reforms and underlines  the problems that
remain.
To avoid confusions and since  the analysis ends in end-1992, throughout  I have refermd  to the fonmer  CSFR as 'the CSFR.-Page 3
B.  PAST  LEGACIES:  TH1E  STARTING  CONDITIONS
Until the early-1980s,  the socialist  banking system  that prev'iled in most eastern  European
countries  consisted  of a mono-bank  that performed  the roles of central  bank and commercial  bank, and
a savings  bank that provided services  to households. The mono-bank  was responsible  for issuing
currency and granting short-term credit to enterprises. In addition, the specialized  banks provided
long-term  finance for investment. Unlike banks in western countries  which granted credit based on
credit risk analysis, bar ks in former socialist  countries granted credit based on central  plan decisions.
Banks, therefore, allocated  credit passively  and performed  the role of government  ageneies.
1. Abandoning  the Basic Socialist  Banking  Syste
The five countries  began tne reform towards a market economy  in 1989. Each country  differs
from the others in their timing and methods  of  reform (see table 1). The ',reakup of the mono-bank,
the establishment  of a two-tier banking  system and the abolishment  of the central  plan targets signaled
that reform was underway.
Table 1.  Banking  Systems  Starting Conditions
Date  of political  opening.  1989  April 1989  November  1989  Novemnber  December
1989  1989
Date of breakup  of the mono-bank  and  January 1987  January 1989  January 1990  January 1990  December
atart  of the two-tier  banking  syatem.  1990
Number  of atate-owned commercial  4  9  2  59  4
banks.  1/
Number  of private or foreign owned  2  5  0  0  2
comrnercial bank.  1/  _
Number  of sp~cialized  banks (excluding  10  I  I  8  2
foreign exchange banks). 1/
Numnber  of banks specialized in foreign  1  3  2  1  1
exchange trnsactions.  1/
Number of Savings Banks.  1/  1  1  2  1  1
Date of last revision of last legislation.  1/  January  1987  January 1989  January  1990  May 1990  April 1991
Source: World Bank (1989,1990 and  1991b) and Thome  (1992).
1/ Estimated  at the date of the breakup of the  mono-bank.Page 4
Hungary was the first country to introduce  changes  in its banking  system. It started very early
on and fo'lowed a gradual process.  Unlike  the other countries, the change  in economic  policies was
not m.arked  by a single date when a big bang stabilization  program was undertaken. In the early 1970s,
with the New Economic  Mechanism, it abolished  the centrally-determined  targets and allowed
enterprise managers  greater freedom. Managers  were granted a greater role in decision-making  and in
the management  of enterprises, thus starting the experience  in enterprise self-management  under
socialism. In 1987 the authorities  established  a two-tier  banking system and broke up the mono-bank
into a central bank and two i;tate-owned  banks.
In Poland the authorities  started introducing  changes  in the banking  system in the early 1980s.
In early 1982 the authorities  granted more autonomy  to the mono-bank,  allowed  banks more itexibility
in meeting  the centrally-determined  targets and provided  for the establishment  of new banks.
Significant  changes  started in the late 1980s.  In 198' the government  separated the savings  bank from
the mono-bank  and, in January 1989, the government  broke up the mono-bank  into nine state-owned
commercial  banks and established  a two-tier banking  system. The authorities  also granted bank
management  a greater role in credit allocation.
In the  CSFR,  Bulgaria and Romania, the break up of the mono-bank  and the establishment  of
a two-tier banking  system followed  the political  opening  of 1989 (see table 1). Enterprise and bank
managers  were granted more freedom simultaneous  with the authorities' abolition of the central  plan
targets. In these three countries, there was no tradition of enterprise  self-management  as there was in
Poland and Hungary.
In the  CSFR,  the authorities  broke up the mono-bank  by establishing  three new banks, two
state-owned  commercial  banks (one for uiie  Czech and one for the Slovak  Republic) and one bank
specializing  in long term finance, which served both republics. In Bulgaria the government  broke up
the mono-bank into 59 commercial  banks and established  8 specialized  banks. Moreover, thePage 5
govermw nt decided to transfer ownership  of banks to the state-owned  enterprises.  In Romania  the
mono-bank's  commercial  banking  activities were transferreu to a recently vstablished  state-owned  bank
and the emerging banking  system consisted  of few banks.
L ,  Jling  Conditions
The banking  systems  of the five countries  were similar in terms cf the institutional  problems
confronted.  These  were:
(a)  slow progress in introducing  market-oriented  payment inechanisms  with long delays in paymerk;
and lack of contract  enforcement,  leading to a large "float" in the banking  system;
(b)  a lack of a regulatory and supervisory  framework  adapted to the needs of a market-economy,
and supervisors  ill-prepared  to supervise banks operating in a market economy;
(c)  a large proportion  of bank nonperforming  loans, especially  held by the large state-  Yned  (SO)
banks, which resulted from the lending practices  during the central  plan period;
(d)  an inexperienced  group of bankers appointed  by government  officials and ill-trained  for
managing  banks in a market-economy  and for assessing  risk of potential customers;  and
(e)  close  ownership links between  state enterprises  and banks which prevented  banks from taking
independent  credit decisions  with respect to their matin  customers.
There are, however, a number of differences  that distinguish  these five countries.  The first
difference  is the relative importance  of the commercial  and specialized  banks (see Table 2).  Hungary
and the CSFR relied more on commercial  banks than on specialized  banks.  In both countries,  once
the authorities  b;oke up the mono-banks,  commercial  banks held most of the banking  systems' assets.
In Poland, Bulgaria and Romania,  the opposite  was true,  the specialized  banks account for the bulk of
hank assets and were more important  than the commercial  banks.  The importance  of specialized  banks
was particularly  true in Poland and Bulgaria,  nations that established  the largest number of state-owned
commercial  banks.Page 6
The second difference  is the importance  of the savings bank. This indicated  the segmentation
between a group of banks that were net borrowers and lent to the enterprise sector (e.g., the
commercial  arnd  specialized  banks)  and a group of banks that were net lenders and captured most of the
deposits. This is also an indicator  of bank competition,  since net borrower banks depended  on funding
by net lender banks.
Table 2.  Structure of the Banking  Systom
Ratio  of all qecialized banks' asets to  47 7  79.1  32.2  54.0  52.3
total  assets.  ,I  V_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Ratio  ofcommercial  banks' asset to  35 0  8 5  67.8  25.5  18.2
total  asset  1,2/ 
Ratio  of totl savings  bank deposits  to  '.5  12.1  52.3  46.2  80.8
total deposits.  1/  ___  I  __  _
Savings  Bank's houaeh&ds'  deposits  as  81.3  70.5  100.0  100.0  100.0
ratio of total household deposits. 1/  _
Ratio of Ssvings Bank loans to deposits.  100.0  61.3  16.9  33.5  4.9
Source: World Bank (1989,1990  1991b and 1991c) and Thome  (1992).
i/  Estimnated  at the date of the breakup of the mono-bank. Bec4.us in Hungary the centrl  bank held a large portion  of the banking
systens'  total  Issets the sum of the ratios of conunercial  and specialized banks'  assets to total assets is low relative to the other
countries.
2/  In the ease of CSFR, these ratios are calculated using total loans instead of total asuts,  as assets by group of banks were not
available.
In Hungary and Poland this segmentation  was less sharp.  The high ratio of savings  bank loans
to deposits indicates  that they were not a source of funds for commercial  and specialized  banks.
Instead, savings  banks used their resources to grant mortgage  and other types of loans to households.
In the CSFR, Bulgaria and Romania,  the savings  banks were net lenders to the specialized  and
commercial  banks. When the Bulgarian  authorities  broke up the mono-bank  in 1990 the Bulgarian
Savings Bank was using nearly 70 percent ot its deposits to fund the commercial  and specialized  banks.
In the CSFR and Romania, it was 83 and 95 percent respectively. Savings  bank deposits in these
countries  accounted  for larger proportions  of total and households  deposits.Page 7
C.  RJITRUCTURING  BANKING  SYSTEMS: THE GOVERNMENT  POLICIES
Starting n 1990, the five Eastern European countries' ba-king system started to char.ge  as a
result of the polit-.al opening and th9 introduction  of market forces.  Between 1987  and 1989, some
governrnents  relaxed restrictions  or. he establishment  of new banks to encourage  bank competition.
This resulted in an increase i .the number of banks. In Hungary, the number  of banks increased  from
19 in late 1987  to 37 in late 1991; in Poland, from 18 in early 1989  to about 86 in late 1991; in the
CSFR from 7 in early 1990  to 27 in late 1991; in Bulgaria from 69 in early 1990 to 75 in late 1991;
and in Romania  from 10 in late 1990  to 16 in early 1992.
In most countries, though, the major restructuring  bega.n  in 1990. Some governrnents
introduced changes  in theil monetary and credit policies as part of their macroeconomic  adjustment
programs. Usually the bank restructuring  scheme  consisted  of a new regulatory and supervisory
framework,  a policy framework  for dealing with bank nonperforming  loans as part of the enterprise
restructuring, and bank privatization  plans.  We now turn to the discussion  of these three aspects  of the
restructuring  schemes  as a way to understand  the policy measures  adopted  by each government  and the
way governments  linked bank and enterprise restructuring.
1. Introducing  a New Regulatory  and Supervisory  Framework
Between 1991 and 1992 the five countries  introduced  a new regulatory and supervisory
framework. But some countries  kept important  asPects  of the old iegislation. By mid-1992  Hungary,
the CSFk and Bulgaria had introduced a new central bank and banking  laws, modeled on western
economies  legislation. Although Poland and Romania  introduced  a new central bank law, they
amended  the existing  banking laws and key elements  of market-economies  banking  legislation  were still
missing by late 1992. By contrast, Hungary is the only country  of the five to have introduced a new
bankruptcy  law that defined the legal role of banks in restructuring  and privatzing  1OEs.Page  8
These five countries  have tollowed  two very different banking  m.dels (see Table 3).  Hlungary
nas opted for the Anglo-Saxon  model of separating  commercial  and investmenit  banking  functions.  The
Table 3.  Regul&tory  Frameworks
a...s.t..  ..
Date  of  enactment  by  November  1991  April  1992  December  1991  March  1992  March  1991
Parliament  of  new  (tAmendn-  its to  (Arendrenta
banking  regulation  existing  L  being
considered)
Separation  between  Yes  No,  univeral  No,  universal  No,  univerul  No,  universal
commercial  and  banking  banking  banking  banking
binking  investment
activities?
Limits  on  the  volume  I  Commercial  and  Up  to  2S %  of  total  Up  to  25 z  of  total  Up  to  100%  of  Up  to  20%  of
of  equity  ban,  a can  specialized  banks  arc  capital  and  reserves  capital  and  to.'l  capital  in  total  capitsl  and
hold  allowed  to hold  15 %  and  is planning  to  reserves  and  long-term  reserves  and
and  100%  of  adjusted  increase  it to 50  %.  excludes  investments  ar.J  N3R  pLans to
capita!  in  long  term  collaterals  taket,  excludes  increase  it to
investments,  possession  by  collaterals  taken  100%
respectively;  and  banks  which  must  porsesion  by
excludes  collaterals  be  sold  within  2  banks  which  must
taken  posse.sion  by  years.  be  sold  within  3
banks  which  must  be  yeaq.
sold  within  3  years.
Capital  adequacy  o  percent  of  8  percent  of  8 percent  of  8 percent  of  Propowed  to  be  8
risk-weighted  assets  to  risk-weighted  assets  risk-weightcd  risk-weighted  percent  ot
be  met  in  January  assets  to  be  met  assets,  transitional  rii-weighted
1993  end-1995  period  to  be  assets  by
determined  end-1994
Limits  on  lending  to  Up  to  25%  of  Up  to  15%  of  Up  to 25%  af  Up  to 25%  of  Up  to  20% of
a single customer  adjusted capital  assets.  capital  capital  capital
Limits on lending to  Up to 5% of adjusted  Up to  15% of  Determrined by the  Up to 1% of  Up to  15% of
shareholders  capital  capital.  bank statutory  paid-in capital  the bank i  capital
body  and  remerveh
Deposit insurance  Banks should have a  A new deposit  State-owned bakas  By law banks  Only stte
mandatory deposit  insurance should be  and governments  should  offer  savings bank'a
protection by  in effect since  deposits  deposit inaurance  deposits
end-1992  March  1993.  up to an  amount
to be specified
Minimum  capital for  USS 13.3m for  I  No explicit limit  Determined by the  USS 10.0m  USS 3.Sm
new banks  commercial and US  $  except that it should  central bank
6.6m for specialized  be proportional  to
bank  the size of
anticipated
activities.
Limits on ownership  State  and a single  Maximum  No limiut  Authorization  No limnits
individual rmy hold  ownership  is 50%  from central bank
more than 25 % of  by a single
equity.  No restriction  individual or firm.
oa foreign banks
Institution  State Banking  National Bank of  State Bank of  National Bank of  National Bank of
responsible for  Supervision  Agency  Poland  Czechos!ovakia  Bulgaria  Roman  aia
supervision  (SBA)  and  NBH
Standards  for loan  No,  in preparation  No,  in preparation  No,  in preparation  No, in  No, in
classification  and  prepartion  preparmtion
provisioning
Source:  Countrica  central bank and banking  law acts and World  Bank  (1992).Page 9
other four countries have opted for the German  model of universal  banking. This has defined  the role
of banks in the transition. In Hurgary commercial  banks can attract deposits and grant loans but are
restricted  on the volume  of investments  they may hold. Investment  banks cannot attract deposits but
can engage  in enter:-rise  restructuring  and other types of investment  activities. Their investments  are
only limited  by their capital and reserves. In the other four countries, however, banks are empowered
to performed  both the commercial  and investment  bank functions  and the legislation  is very liberal in
allowing  banks to make long-term  investments  in areas such as real estate and securities.
The Bulgarian and Romanian  legislation  is the most liberal, since it allows banks to invest  up
to 100 percent of their capital and reserves. By contrast, the Polish and the CSFR bank legislation
limits long-term  investments  to 25 percent of the bank capital and reserves.'
Although  all five countries introduced  similar monetary  and credit instruments,  by imposing
bank reserve requirements,  credit ceilings and  interest rates, some small differences  remain. Hungary
nlone  has retained interest rate ceilings and it also has the highest reserve  requirement. The level of
reserve requirement  is only a relevant indicator  in Hungary  and Poland.'  In the other three countries
most deposits are held by savings banks, and commercial  banks are funded by the interbank  market or
the central  bank (see table 2).
All five countries  have opted in principle  for a capital adequacy  of 8 percent of risk-adjusted
assets, a choice that conforms with the Basle  Agreement.  In practice  they use different methods  to
calculate  risk-adjusted  assets. To date, Hungary has a method  for calculating  the risk-adjusted  assets,
but the CSFR and Bulgaria are still drafting reguiations,  and Poland and Romania  have not drafted the
8 percent capital requirement.  In addition, Hungary and the CSFR have defined a transitional  period
In Hungary, CSFR and Bulgaria the law  excludes  from long-terrn investments  any collateral  or pledge  that banks  might have taken  poe-
seuion of as  a result  of foreclosing  on guarantees  provided by their borrowers.
In Hungary reserve  requirement  were 16  percent  and remunerated  in end-1992,  in Poland  it was  30 and  10 percent  for short  and long
terrn  deposis, respectively,  and remunerated.  Ir  the former CSFR, Bulgaria and  Romania,  reserve  requirements  were 8, 7 and  10 percent
rempectively,  and  also  remunerated.Page  10
for compliance. Hungarian  banks should have complied  with a 7.25 percent risk-weighted  capital  by
January 1992 and 8 percent by 1993. CSFR banks should  comply with 6.25 percent by end-1993, and
8 percent by end-1995. Bulgaria is in the process of defining  the transitional  period; in Romania  banks
will be required  to comply with the 8 percent ratio by end-1994;  and Poland will soon enforce this
requirement.
All five limit exposures  to a single borrower and shareholders. The banking  law limits the risk
of losses and prevents  shareholders  from benefiting  from bank ownership. Limits on exposure to a
single borrower range from a high of 25 percent of capital in four of the five countries, to a low limit
of 15 percent of capital for Poland. The Bulgarian  and Hungarian  legislation  is the strictest limiting
lending  to shareholders  to 1 and 5 percent, respectively,  whi;  CSFR and Poland have a limit of 15
percent.
The legislation  is different  in other important  respects  as well. First, few countries have a
deposit insurance  scheme. In Hungary, Poland and Bulgaria  the banking  law requires that banks offer
deposit insurance,  but the schemes  have yet to be introduced. The CSFR and Romania  have the old
deposit  protection whereby  only state-  owned banks and government  deposits are protected. Providing
a deposit insurance  scheme  for banks with a large proportion  of nonperforming  loans is problematic.
Such banks have a higher probability  of default, and hold a large proportion  of all banking system
loans, which increases  the overall cost of the deposit insurance  and imposes  a high burden on
well-managed  banks with low nonperforming  loans.
Second, countries impose  different restrictions  on establishing  new banks and on bank
ownership. The Hungarian  and Bulgarian  bank legislation  have the highest minimum  capital
requirements. In Hungary the government's  share is limited, and together with Poland, limits the
proportion  of shares held by a single  individual  and/or institution. The CSFR and Romania  are morePage  11
liberal concerning  the entry of new banks.  Entry of new banks is only limited  by the minimum  capital
requirements,  while in Poland new banks only need the National  Bank of Poland's approval.
Third, in practice, bank's ability to initiate foreclosure  procedures  is weak because  few
countries  have a well-functioning  bankhuptcy  law and/or have defined  property rights. Yet this is key
for the development  of the banking  system. Such statutes  define the instruments  banks use to exert
pressure on borrowers and it defines  the protection  provided  for insolvent  enterprises. Because  most
bank loans have been granted to SOEs and banks cannot foreclose  on state-owned  assets, banks have
been inhibitu  from using foreclosure  and liquidation  as instruments  to impose  discipline  on
loss-making  SOEs and force their restructuring. Without  clearly defined  property  2.ghI  bank  cannot
use SOEs' assets as collateral  on loans and therefore their absence  limits the supply of credit.  In most
cases banks are demanding  personal  mortgages,  bank deposits or cross-guarantees  as a condition  for
granting a loan, all factors which have increased  the borrowers' risk.
Hungary and CSFR have introduced  bankruptcy  legislation,  and Poland, Bulgaria and Romania
plan to introduce  it soon. 6 However, only Hungary  has a market-oriented  bankruptcy  law. To forestall
the massive  failure, the CSFR granted enterprises  a one-year transition  period. Aside from Poland,
there is no scheme  for restructuring  enterprises  before they fall into bankruptcy.  There are a large
number  of enterprises  in weak financial situation. In fact, the large number of financially  weak
enterprises  in most countries will overload  the courts and postpone  liquidation. An example  is the case
of Hungary which introduced  a type of Chapter 11 clause  in their bankruptcy  law.  But to protect
themselves  by the end of March 1992  more than 2,000 enterprises  filed for bankruptcy.' This flood of
cases resulted in large losses for banks and postponed  enterprise restructuring  and liquidations.
*  In Romanua  the authorities  introduced  the so-cailed  Law 76 which  allowed  banks  to foreclose  onb on enterprises  that failed to repay
their global compenstion bank loans  in 1992. However,  anecdotal  evidence  indicates  that banks refrained  from foreclosing  on enterpriwes
because  of property rights  isues and because the legal procedure  would have been  too long.  Insad,  some  anecdotal  and enpirical evi-
dence indicates  that banks refinanced  enterprises'  overdue  global  conmpensation  bank loans.
7  See Bwuineu  Eastern  Europe  (1992)Page  12
A key problen common  to all countries  has been delay in instilling  market-oriented  banking
supervision capable  of enforcing  the banking  law.  Bank supervisors  must be able to carryout on- and
off-site  bank examinations. These are key for developing  the banking  system because it assures
depositors' trust on the soundness  of the banking  system, ensures strong bank governance. It assures
that bank problems  will be corre.ed  on time and/or banks will be removed  from the system. Hungary
is the only to have made progress in: retraining  existing supervisors,  bringing  u3lified
supervisors  acquainted  with western practices, introducing  new accounting  star  for barks and
providing  the institutional  strength needed  for conducting  bank supervision. It w_. thr  -nly country
that established  a new bank supervision institution  (e.g., SBS), while the other four coimnries  left the
old central banks' departments  responsible  for bank supervision (see table 3).
None of the five countries  have introduced  standards  for loan classification  and provisioning.
As a temporary arrangement  most countries  had relied on external  bank audits. Yet loan classification
standards are central for bank supervision.  Disclosure and classification  of loans by banks should
enable depositors to select a bank to deposit  their savings. Hungary and CSFR are close to introducing
such a regulation,  Poland, Bulgaria and Romania  are planning  to do it at a later date.
2. Institutional  Measures
Institutional  measures  were taken to deal with the inefficiencies  of the payment  system and to
address the banks'  nonperforming  loans.  Few countries  have undertaken  measures  to overcome
problems  with the structure of the banking  system. Problems with the structure include: the
segmentation  of the banking  system between  a circuit of banks serving enterprises and another serving
households, and the oligopolistic  competition  resulting from the coexistence  of a few large banks
holding  most of the bad assets and of a large number  of small banks.  Most countries  decided to deal
with these problems  by enhancing  bank competition  and removing  the bank specialization  by allowing
banks to undertake  most banking activities.Page  13
Overcoming  the Payment  System's Inefficiencies
Because  of its importance  for enhancing  bank competition  and making  monetary  policy
effective, most countries  started their institutional  reform with the reform of the payment system (see
table 4).  Most countries began  from scratch because  centrally  planned economies  did not rely on such
a system. Unlike a market-based  banking  system, in a centrally  planned  economy  there was no need to
link all banks; it was desirable to segment  the banking  system.
The five countries  followed  a similar approach; in all progress was slow. Establishing  a
payment system was a cumbersome  and complicated  undertaking. It required creating  a national
electronic network for settling and clearing  payments. It also required introducing  a regulatory aid a
policy framework  to guide the operation  of the system.
Most countries  took a long time before starting  to operate the payment system and some are
still experiencing  delays  in bank transfers. The delays  are worst in Bulgaria and Romania, which got a
late start.  Moreover, delays in verification  of transfers and settlements  led some central banks to
assume  the liability of banks with insufficient  funds  in their correspondent  accounts.
The inefficiencies  of the payment  system have hindered bank competition.  The largest banks
with more developed  branch networks  can offer better payment services  to their customers  and
therefore have obvious advantagus  over the small ones. The inefficiencies  also has impeded  the
efficient  management  of monetary policy.  The central  bank had to keep large outstanding  balances  to
ensure their liquidity  and when the authorities  made monetary  policy restrictive it resulted in bank
illiquidity  rather than in an increase  in the inter-bank interest  rate.Page  14
Table 4.  Institutional Measures
__~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~i::  __
Date  of Introduction  of  1988  and takes 10  1990  and  takea  1991  and  takes  1991  and  takes  1992  and takes
lhe  payment system  days  between 10 and  about 3  days  between 15 and 20  between 15 and
land avernge delay  in  20 days  days  21 days
ettling  a bank cheque
R  emnoval  of banks bad  Yes, 50 percent of  Yes, banks'  Yes, 30 percent  of  Yes, 100 percent  Yea,  90 percent
!,%ana  and/or  three Largest  banks  foreign  exchange  all outstanding  of enterprises  of all enterprise
r.capialization  of  nonperforming  loans  losses were  loans  to the  loans  iuanding  nonperforning
bankb  using fiscal  inherited  in 1987,  covered  in 1991  enterprise sector  in  at end-1990  were  loans  outsanding
leources,  which  accounted  for  and a new bank  January 1991.  gusrarteed by the  in December
1.7  percent of total  recapitalization  is  state.  1990.
SOEs loans  by  being  considered
end-1987.  in 1993.
Audits  were used to  Yes  Yes  No, based on  No, based  on totAl  No
dletrtmined  amount  of  banks' own  loans  granted in
ecapitalizations  assessment  end-1990
Instrun  -it  for  government  government  bonds  Nonperforming  government  Proposed  to be
removing  banks' bad  guarantees  callable  denorninated  in  loans  were  guarantees  and  4-year
loans and/or  upon the initiation  foreign currency;  transferred to the  bonds  government
recApitalizing  banks  of liquidation  and for the new  Consolidation  bonds.
procedures.  recapitalization  Bank and
15-vears  govemment honda
government bonds  were issued for
including  S  years  recapitalizing
of grace  banks
Amount of  Pt 10.5 bn in  USS 5.5 bn in  Kcs 120 bn of  Lev 4.1  bn in  Lei 150 bn in
nonperfroming  loans  government  dollar-denominate  banks  government  bonds  banks
covered  by the budget  guarantees  or 1.7  d government  nonperformning  and  the  nonperforrning
percent of total  bonds issued to  loans  were  government  loans,  Lei 50 bn
banks'  loans  finance the  transferred to the  provided  for bank
outstanding with  foreign exchange  Consolidation  guaranteed on toe  recapitalization.
enterprises by  losses;  and an  Bank and ,in  Lev 46 bn bank
end-1987  undetermined  addition, a transfer  outstanding  in
amount for the  of Kcs 50 bn was  end-1990.






Link bank  Yes, indirectly  Yes, directly  Yes, indirecUy  Yes, directly  No
recapitalization to
enterprise  privatization
Link bank  No  No  No  No  No
recapitalization  to bank
privatization  _
Do banks have to  Yes  Yes, in the new  Yes  No  No
approve  enterprises  in  scheme
armarears,eitfitiorhno
plans?
Enterprise privatization  Subsidized loans  Yes, the Mass  Yes, the Voucher  It is being  Yes, similar  to
involved a giveaway  have been offered to  Privatization  Scheme  considered  Poland and
scheme.  nationals purchasing  CSFR's  schemes
shares  using private
I  I  I  I investment funds.
Source: World Bank (1992),  Demekas and Khan (1991) , OECD (1991), The National Bank of Hungary  (1991) and Thorne (1992).Page  15
Macroeconomic  Conditions  and Schemes  for Dealing with Banks' Bad Loans
In 1991, the SOEs in most countries  started experiencing  difficulties. The causes of the
problem were multiple: the introduction  of market forces, the trade shock from the collapse  of the
CMEA, the economic  recession  resulting  from the macroeconomic  adjustment  and the introduction  of
new accounting  standards. All these factors, in combination,  made the fragile financial  situation of
most enterprises apparent. The enterprise  crisis led to a sharp fall in overall production. Moreover,
even though most governments  had undertaken  very drastic cuts in their expenditures  and introduced
new tax systems, the SOEs crisis undermined  the government's  ability  to balance  the budget.
The crisis of the enterprise sector showed  up in the banking  system. Banks in Hungary and
Poland, which posted large profits until 1990, started showing  large nonperforming  loans by 1991. In
Poland, CSFR and Bulgaria, banks started to allow SOEs to capitalize  the interest on their loans as a
way of helping them to cope  with the crisis.  In Poland the capitalization  of interest accounted  for 100
percent of the credit expansion  in 1991; and in Bulgaria  banks, on average, capitalized  about 50
percent of the interest on loans in 1991. In Hungary, Poland, CSFR, Bulgaria  and Romania, SOEs'
resorted to inter-firm  credit as a way of coping with their illiquidity. At one point, in Romania  the
inter-firm  credit problem  became  so acute that it trapped both creditworthy  and noncreditworthy  SOEs
and threatened  the collapse  of the entire enterprise sector had the government  not stepped  in.
INITIAL  MLACROECONOMIC  CONDmONS.  It seems straightforward  that the countries' ability to
overcome the bad debt problem and to introduced bank reform would be influenced by the initial
macroeconomic  conditions,  in particular, by the fiscal costs. Yet. in all countries  the proportion  of
nonperfroming  loans to total loans was quite similar despite  different macroeconomic  conditions  (see
table 5). Countries  such as Hungary, Poland and the CSFR faced more favorable  initial macroeconomic
conditions:  first, the size of total bank loans (and thus of bad loans) as a ratio of GDP was relatively
low and, second, the macroeconomic  adjustment  programs were most successful. Both of thesePage  16
conditions  implied  that  Table  S.  Macroeconomic  Indicators,  Norperforming  Loans and  Fiscal
Costs
dealing with banks'  bad debts  _  !
Ratio of Enterprises'  Bank
would be less costly in fiscal  Credit to GDP rin  percent)
In end of 1990  25.8  15.6  60.5  78.8  38.6
terms. In Hungary and  In  June 1991  24  18.4  62.4  47.8  44.6
Real  Interest  Rates
Poland the total enterprises'  In end of 1990'  1.9  -44.4  -32.6  -35.5  -96.8
In 3rd Quarter  of 1991  8.1  15.6  2.3  -71.9  -31.7
loans as a share of GDP was  _na  a  fhiito  i
AnnaaJ Rate of lrMJanon  O?n
percent)
less than 20 percer.t but  ..!  In end of 1990  33.4  250  16.6  64  150.1
In June 1991  36  79.9  71.3  554.6  224.9
Bulgaria and Romania  these  Memo Items:  ____
Estimnated  Ratio  of  50  40  55  44.2  36.6
were about 50 percent. This  Nonperforrning  to Total
Loans  in  1991 (in percent)  _
might be explained  by the  Estimated  Fiscal Cost of  5.4  6.5  5.6  17.7  22.9
Removing  all Bank
Nonperforming  Loans Cin
fact that Hungary and Poland  percent of GDP) in June
1991'
started the banking  reform  Source: Countries official  statistics  and author's estimates
I  Because  the end of 1990  CSFR's real interest  rate  was not available,  I have used the first
several years before the  quarter of 1992  .
2  It is the interest cost of either swapping  government  bonds for bank nonperforming  loans
political  openingtook pIace.  or of providing a governrnent  guarantee  on these loans. Since  there is no market  government
polItIcal opening took place.  bonds  in these countries,  I have used the average nominal lending rate as  a proxy.
In particular, the size of the
monetary  overhang in these two countries  was relatively small in early 1990, while in Bulgaria and
Romania  it was very high.  Furthermore,  Hungary, Poland and the CSFR were very effective  in
stabilizing  their economies  and in lowering  the inflation  rates.
The low ratio of total loans to GDP and the successful  macroeconomic  conditions  had two very
imDortant  consequences First, the lower inflation  rate, by lowering  the nominal interest rate, reduced
die fiscal cost of overcoming  the enterprises' bad debt problems. For instance, had governments
assumed  all bank bad loans, the fiscal cost would have been about 6 percent of GDP in Hungary,
Poland and the CSFR, while it would have been about 20 percent of GDP in Bulgaria and Romania.
While assuming  all bad loans would not be good economic  policy, it illustrates  the likely effect of suchPage  17
a decision  on macroeconomic  performance. Therefore, the authorities  in Bulgaria and Romania  were
less inclined  to provide a bold solution  to the bad debt problem and more willing to let the high
inflation  rates and negative  real interest rates reduice  the real value of the bad debts even though this
undermined  the economic  stabilization  effort.
Second, the shift to positive real interest rates in Hungary, Poland and the CSFR (most likely
as a result of the macroeconomic  stability  and lower inflation  rates), by increasing  the demand  for bank
financial  assets, enabled banks to expand,  to reduce the proportion of bad loans and to increase  their
cash income. The positive real interest rates, by rationing the demand  for loans, also may have
encouraged  financial  discipline  among  borrowers.
SCHEMES  FOR  DEALING  wiTH  ENTRPRisEs  BAD  Lo-Ns. Although  all the countries  introduced
schemes  for dealing with enterprises' bad debts and for reforming  their banking  systems, there were
important  differences  among  them. These are summarized  in Table 4 and are briefly described and
evaluated  for each country  below.
Hungary  followed  a gradual approach  to the problem  of the nonperforming  loans and tried to
distinguish  the solution of banks' nonperforming  loans from the solution  for overcoming  SOEs
problems. Until end-1989  the authorities  argued  that banks were in good financial  condition. But this
situation started  to change  in late 1989  when the auditors applied  stricter standards and the size of the
nonpirforming loans in the three large banks became  apparent  (amounting  to Ft 10.5 bn or 1.7 percent
of total bank loans outstanding  with enterprises  by end-1987). 8
In December 1991, the government  recognized  this problem. The government  responded  by (a)
providing  government  guarantees  on 50 percent of the three banks' nonperforming  loans still
outstanding  by the end of 1987;9  (b) exempting  from income  tax additional  loan loss provisions on the
5  See Nyers and Rosta Lutz (1992)  for a discussion  of the whole enterprise privatization process.
These five-year guarantees were only callable when  liquidation proceedings on the debtors had initiated;.e  18
nonperforming  loans; (c) limiting distribution  of dividends  until the nonperforming  loans have been
fully provided; (d) allowing  the large commercial  banks to swap its inherited  stock of nonperforming
loans for equity;'° and (e) accelerating  the privatization  of banks in order to attract new capital into
these three banks.
There are two important  aspects  of the Hungarian  scheme. First, the scheme  might fail to take
full account  of the total nonperforming  loans in these three banks. According  to independent  bank
audits, nonperfroming  loans hovered  between Ft 50 bn and Ft 100 bn by the end of 1991." Second,
the scheme link,d the recapitalization  of banks to the effectiveness  of the bank managers  in dealing
with bad debtors. This was done by limiting  the use of guarantees  to the initiation of liquidation
proceeding  on the debtors and by forcing  the debtors to seek approval  of restructuring  schemes  from
the banks. This approach  relied on the effectiveness  of bank managers' assessment  of enterprises'
future. Preliminary  evidence  indicates  that bank managers  requested  additional  guarantees and granted
additional  loans to debtors to improve  their portfolio, and to limit the required loan loss provisions.
Aware that the true problem originated  in the enterprise  sector, the authiorities  decided to
accelerate  the privatization  of enterprises  through the appointment  of a Minister  without  portfolio. The
authorities, committed  to the gradual approach,  increased  the number  of enterprises  for sale and
provided  low interest finance  to citizens  to purchase  shares in these enterprises. The National Bank of
Hungary (NBH) introduced  a series of refinance  credit lines at subsidized  interest rates (subsidy
amounted  to 25 percent of the base rate) to encourage  the sale of enterprises  and starting up new ones.
The NBH argued that the subsidy  would not result in NBH losses  because  the proceeds would be used
to retire the 6 percent interest government  debt." 2
I°  An example is the  Hungarian Credit Bank which swapped Ft 6.42 billion of Tungram's  bad loans for 91 percent of its equity.  A con-
trolling interest of 51 percent was later sold to General  Electric.  See Radio Free  Europe Research Report (1992).
"1  This is a very conservative estnimte,  sone  other studies based on  estimrated arrears  calculate the size of nonperfroniing  loans in as
much as Ft 500 bn or 50 percent of total loans in 1991.
11  Se  National Bank of Hungary (1991) for a discussion of the refinance schemes available to national willing to buy or dart  new
enterprises.Page  19
Poland, in a recent attempt  linked the recapitalizatiun  of the nine commercial  banks to the
restructuring of the SOEs.  Poland started confronting  the problem of banks in 1990, when both the
banks' and the enterprises' financial  statements  showed  a .ry  good financial  situation. The authorities
only dealt with the foreign exchange  losses  held by two specialized  banks and amended  the regulatory
and supervisory  framework,' 3 The authorities  improved  the management  of the commercial
state-owned  banks through twining  arrangements  with western banks and by establishing  supervisory
boards. Little was done to establish  a regulltory and supervisory  framework.
In 1991, the situation of the enterprises  and banks deteriorated  quickly and, as a result, the
economy  experienced  its second year of recession. By mid-1991,  the first audits  of some commercial
banks already showed  a rapid accumulation  of nonperforming  loans. According  to bank audits  the
proportion  of nonperforming  loans increased  from about 15 percent of total loans in end-1990  to 40
percent in June 1992. This prompted the government  to design a scheme  for dealing with both the
banks' and the enterprises' problems.
The government s improving  the nine banks' governance  by: (a) recapitalizing  the nine
commercial  banks to a 12 percent of capital  adequacy  level using 15-years  and 5-years of grace
govermnent  bonds; (b) granting banks' supervisory  boards greater control  of and oversight  over bank
management;  and (c) introducing  a market-oriented  regulatory and supervisory  framework.  The nine
banks now, more effectively  governed, would participate  in the restructuring  and privatization  of
enterprises. Using tools such as partial debt write-downs  and debt-equity  swaps, the banks are
anticipated  to play a key role in enterprise restructuring  and privatization.  Legislation  will place limits
on banks' activities and thus prevent banks from granting new loans to enterprises  and limit the
maximum  volume  of enterprises  shares that banks could  hold to 50 percent of bank capital. Debt relief
would be contingent  on enterprises  submitting  restructuring  proposals acceptable  to banks. Enterprises
LIn  mnid-1991,  the government issued USS 5.5 bn in foreign currency-denominated  bonds with a miaturity of twelve and a ':!f  years for
rccapitalizing these two banks.Page 20
that became  nonviable  even after debt-relief  or whose  managers  would fail to provide a restructuring
plan acceptable  to the banks, would be forced into liquidation.
Because  the success  of the scheme  depends on limiting  the social consequences  of massive  lay
offs, the government  will establish  a special fund for enterptises w/hose  liquidation  might have
important  social consequences. This fund will be sanctioned  in the 1993  budget law and will be used
for restructuring and/or paying the costs of enterprises  considered  socially important,  for example,
enterprises  whose liquidation  would have important  social effects or enterprises  the government  wants
to retain.
For the successful  implementation  of this scheme  the competence  and independence  of bank
managers  is critical.  Bank mandgers  are responsible  for determining  the viability of enterprises  and the
size of the financial  subsidy. This, however, requires very strong bank governance  like that that
prevails in Japan and Germany.  To some extent, the authorities  have  provided this through the
recapitalization  of banks and through bank regulation  and supervision.  And the scheme as it stands
seems to have been well designed  to reward managers  for good credit decisions,  but not necessarily  to
penalize them in case of bad credit decisions. A good governance  structure must include an incentive
structure with "reward and risk" features that are a common  feature of corporations  in market
economies.  In a market economry  private ownership  means  that the losses  resulting from bad loans are
paid directly out of the owner's capital and the managers  face the risk of being removed. These
penalties are difficult  to introduce  as long as banks are state-owned. In a state-managed  bank the
manager faces no risk in addition to the risk of being removed  and even this threat is somewhat
doubtful  because there are not enough trained replacements.  Perhaps for these reasons the authorities
have found it necessary  to establish  a unit in the Ministry of Finance to monitor the state-owned
bank-led  enterprise restructurings.Page 21
CSFR  chose rapid privatization  of banks and anterprises. In May 1992, the government  started
the first wave if voucher  privatization  by offering 1,491 enterprises  for sale, among  which were
offered about  50 percent of the shares of the two state-owned  commercial  banks. It also put about 50
percent of the shares of the other state-owned  banks in the second wave. The government  plans to use
the other 50 percent of the banks' shares for restitution  and to attract a controlling  partner.
Prior to the privatization  the government  adopted measures  to manage  the banks'
nonperforming  loans. As in Hungary, it provided  for a partial bank recapitalization while relying on
banks, as Poland had done, to identify the viable enterprises.  Yet unlike Hungary  and Poland, CSFR
has accelerated  privatization  to impose  control on both state-owned  enterprises  and banks. The
govermment  proceeded in two steps.
In January 1991,  under pressure from banks, the government  decided to remove a portion of
the nonperfroming  loans.  These perpetual  loans, the TOZ loans, were yielding  six percent interest and
had no amortization  schedule. SOEs were compelled  to take these loans to re-lend to the government,
which was, by the early 1970s, experiencing  a cash shortage. To decide the amount  of the
recapitalization,  the government  asked the banks to select the TOZ loans they wanted  removed from
their balance  sheets.
In February 1991, of the total Kcs 170 bn of TOZ loans held by the two state-owned
commercial  banks, the government  transferred  Kcs 120 bn in loans and liabilities  out of the
commercial  banks and into to a newly established  Consolidation  Bank (KON), which had the sole
function  of holding and collecting  these nonperforming  loans. The liabilities  transferred were deposits
from the central bank, the state-owned  insurance  companies  and the Savings  Bank held by the two
commercial  banks. Moreover, the transferred  loans were retained  as claims on the enterprises  and the
conditions  were renegotiated  by increasing  the interest rate to 13 percent and fixing the maturity  at 8Page 22
years. Similarly,  the commercial  banks also renegotiated  the TOZ loans they kept by increasing  the
interest rate to 22 percent and fixing the maturity at 5 years.
Second, in late 1991, the government  concerned  with the over-indebtedness  of enterprises  that
otherwise  could be viable and with the low capital adequacy  of some of the banks, decided to make
Kcs 50 bn available  for these two purposes. It provided  banks with Kcs 38 bn for overindebted  viable
enterprises, and Kcs 12 bn for recapitalizing  the four commercial  banks and the two savings  banks.
While banks were responsible  for identifying  the enterprises  eligible  for the debt-relief (provided  that
enterpris-c incurred  this debt before 1990), a specially  designed  commission  was responsible  for
reviewin- the bank,-'  selection. In addition, the government  used the Kcs 12 bn to recapitalize  the four
commercial  banks to a 4.2 percent level of capital adequacy  and the two savings  banks to 3.2 percent
level. In doing th.s the government  assumed  that the banks held no more nonperfoiming  loans.
But although  the government  had provided  the banks with Kcs 170  bn for bank recapitalization
purposes (amounting  to about 30 percent of all enterprises' loans outstanding  by end-1991),  anecdotal
evidence  and preliminary  estimates  indicated  that state-banks  held about Kcs 145 bn more in
nonperforming  loans (or about 25 percent of all enterprises' outstanding  loans by end-1991). The
government  indicated  its commitment  to avoiding  further recapitalization  of banks because of fiscal
constraints.
But the presence  of banks with large nonperforming  loans inclined  to take greater risks
together with very liberal restrictions  for establishing  investment  funds for participation  in the voucher
scheme, established  yet another new link between  banks and eniterprises.  As a way of growing out of
their difficulties,  the former state-owned  banks established  their own investment  funds and bid for
enterprises. However becauise  they used a separate institution,  such as the investment  fund,  there have
been limited negative  consequences  on the banks' portfolios. Evidence  indicates  that the former
state-owned  banks' investment  funds accounted  for a large number  of the more than 400 registeredPage 23
investment  funds, banks' investment  funds  made the highest  redemption  offers and thus banks' funds
were the most popular. 14 While the complete  investment  strategy of the state-owned  banks is not yet
entirely clear, at least one part of the strategy appears  to be making  high redemption  offers in order to
accumulate  a large volume of the vouchers and then bid for their client enterprises.  This will enable
banks to influence  their client  enterprises' market value through the bidding  process and to gain full
control of the enterprises' management. The investment  law currently limits an investment  fund to no
more than 20 percent of the holdings of a single  enterprise. Banks  have circumvented  this rule by
establishing  several funds. Therefore, bank investment  funds  mirror the role of investment  bank in the
pre-1930s  U.S. and/or in the pre-1980s  Japan.
Three important  aspects  of the CSFR scheme  stand out.  First, it illustrates  the complexities  of
designing  a strategy for dealing with banks and enterprises. While it might be desirable  to use banks
to enhance  enterprises' corporate governance,  it is risky to rely on banks subject  to moral  hazards.
Because  these banks have large nonperforming  loans they mighlt  not be the best instruments.
Second,  voucher privatization  was a key instrument  for determining  market value ani
enterprise viability. This, in turn, contributed  to financial  reform by providing  banks information
about the financial  condition  of enterprises.  Through voucher  privatization  bank managers  learned the
market value of the enterprises  in their own portfolios  thus enabling them to focus on viable
enterprises.
Third, investment  funds and privatized  banks were the main instrument  to impose  control on
enterprises. There is evidence  that investment  funds and privatized  banks strengthened  their corporate
governance  by getting technical assistance  from western  banks.  For instance,  the privatized, formerly
state-owned,  banks have sought technical  assistance  and established  joint ventures  with foreign banks.
14  Preliminary  infornation indicates  that  out  of the six finds  which are expected  to control 30 percent  of the  assets,  four  are owned  by
state-owned  banks  or insurance  companies.  Moreover, state-owned banks'  funds  redemption  offers  hover  between  10 and 15 times,  while the
other  funds  made  much lower offers.Page  24
In this respect, the CSFR scheme is different from the Polish one where state-owned  banks will
establish  control of enterprises.' 5
Bulgaria and Romania are still designing  their strategies  for restructuring  their banking
systems; in this sense they are behind Hungary, Poland and CSFR.  Most of the measures  taken were
still partial and in some respects  responded  to the problems  faced.
Although  Bulgaria is designing  a program  for dealing  jointly with the bank and enterprise
problems, it has made little progress in enterprise  privatization  and restructuring. It has started with
land and small-scale  enterprise  privatizations  and will soon start a pilot project for the privatization  of
large-scale  enterprises.
Concerning  the strategy for dealing with banks' nonperforming  loans, the government  has
guaranteed  all bank loans granted  by end-1991, which amounted  to about Lev 46 bn (or 37 percent of
1991  GDP). To limit the effect on the budget  deficit, the government  plan-s  to make these guarantees
available gradually. There will be fixed annual ceilings and requirements  regarding the restructuring
and privatizing enterprises. If the arnount  needed for enterprise liquidation  and privatization  is less
than the ceiling, then the bonds can be used for bank recapitalization  based on portfolio reviews.
However, since the privatization  law is still expected  to be passed by Parliament  and the progress in
privatizing and restructuring  enterprises  is slow, the government  is allowing  the different  government
agencies and sectoral Ministries  to use the bonds for granting debt-relief  based on sectoral  priorities.
In the future, it is expected  that the Privatization  Agency  will be responsible  for the coordination.
Moreover,  since banks' nonperforming  loans (which were estimated  in Lev 17 bn by
mid-1991)  might lead to bank liquidity  problems  because  of bad debtors not paying interest en the
loans, the government  has allowed  banks to capitalize  the interest on the central bank deposits held by
banks (which are distributed  among banks in the same  way as the nonperforming  loans). In addition, to
u  I thank  Richard  Salzmann for naking  this point to me at an  EBRD conferencePage 25
preventing  debtors from taking advantage  of the government  guarantee  and to forcing banks to collect
on these loans, the government  has prevented banks from lending  to enterprises  that fall into arrears
with the banks.
To reestablish  control on banks, the government  has created a Bank Consolidation  Company
(BCC). The government  has required  that all state-owned  enterprises  or banks holding shares of other
banks transfer them to the BCC, and by early-1992  the BCC held about  70 percent of all banks' shares.
This was considered  a necessary  precondition  for enabling  banks to take independent  credit decisions
from their borrowers which at the same  time were their owners. Once this process and the bank
portfolio reviews are completed,  the government  plans: (a) to merge the large number of small banks
into eight medium-sized  banks; (b) to recapitalize  the banks by substituting  government  bonds for the
nonperforming  loans; and (c) to start the process of bank privatization.
In Romania, the government  focused  on dealing  with banks' nonperforming  loans and, as in
Bulgaria, the enterprise  privatization  is still in an early stage. The government  has taken three
measures. First, in July 1991  the government  guaranteed  90 percent (or Lei 150  bn) of all bank
nonperforming  loans outstanding  at the end of 1990. It also compelled  banks to take responsibility  for
the remaining  10 percent over a period of several years by building  up their provisions.
Second, in December 1991 the government  introduced  a scheme  for clearing  up the
accumulation  of inter-firm  arrears. By the end of 1991  inter-firm  arrears had reached about  Lei 500 bn
or 40 percent of total bank loans outstanding  to enterprises. The inter-enterprise  arrears threatened  the
collapse of the whole enterprise sector since it linked go^d and bad enterprises.  The gover'iment  netted
out and cleaned  up these arrears by enabling  enterprises  with outstanding  inter-enterprise  credits  to
discount  them with the commercial  banks until January 1991. Banks  should then grant debtor
enterprises  a special loan (a global compensation  bank loan (GCBL))  at market interest rates.  To avoid
the deterioration  in bank portfolios  and force enterprises  to repay the bank loans, the governmentPage  26
guaranteed  the loans that became  due in September 1992  and provided  the creditor bank initiated
foreclosure  proceeding  leading to the liquidation  of the debtor enterprise. To accelerate  enterprise
foreclusure,  the government  passed  the so-called  Law 76. But until the end of 1992  there was no case
of enterprise liquidation  and anecdotal  evidence  suggest that banks refinanced  most of the overdue
GCBL.
Third, in 1993  the government  is planning  to provided  Lei 50 bn in additional  funds for bank
recapitalization.
Although the measures  taken by the Bulgarian  and Romanian  authorities  for dealing with the
banks' institutional  problems  have important  differences,  they both emphasize  re-capitalization  of
banks as the way to improve  banks' corporate  governance. In this sense they resemble  some aspects  of
the Polish scheme and thus, are subject to similar comments. Unlike the Polish scheme, the link
between the bank recapitalization,  on the one hand, and bank restructuring  and enterprise  privatization,
on the other, was not clearly defined. Both the Bulgarian  and Romanian  schemes  can lead to an
across-the-board  debt forgiveness. For instance, in Romania  available  evidence  indicates  that because
the debt write-off was neither linked to enterprise nor to bank restructuring  ent.rprises, banks granted
new loans to these same enterprises. By the end of 1990  bank audits suggested  that these same
enterprises  accounted  for a large proportion  of the post-1990  bank bad loans and for the global
compensation  overdue loans. The post-1990  bad loans accounted  for about two-thirds  of the total bad
loans outstanding  in September 1992, close to 30 percent of total bank loans.
The notable difference  about Bulgaria was the guarantees  provided. Bulgaria is the only
country  that  has openly recognized  all enterprises  loans. All other countries  have been reluctant  to
make such acknowledgments  because  of the large fiscal costs involved.  Instead, most other countries
have opted for guaranteeing  only the proven nonperforming  loans.  In Bulgaria, for instance, the total
guarantees amounted  to Lev 46 bn or 44 percent of total bank loans outstanding  with enterprises byPage  27
end-1991,  while in Romania  the government  assistance  for bank recapitalization  amounted  to Lei 200
bn or 10 percent of total bank loans outstanding  with enterprises  by end-1991. In Hungary, Poland and
the CSFR the government  has agreed to guarantee  a smaller proportion  of total enterprises  loans.
While it  is important  that the government  recognize  the old bad debts, it is also important  to link that
to the overall objective of enterprise privatization  and restructuring.
3. Bank Privatization
All five countries  have as the final objective  of bank restructuring  the privatization  of banks.
Few countries  have succeeded  in this difficult  task.  Of the five countries, the CSFR has privatized  the
largest number  of banks. One bank was completely  privatized  through direct sales, while  the others
were partially privatized  through voucher schemes. Poland might be close to privatizing  two banks.
Yet except for the CSFR, none of the five countries  has conditioned  bank recapitalization  on the
privatization  of banks.  A controlling  investor  is needed  to ensure a strong bank governance.  Despite
this, all five countries see bank privatization  as the only way of improving  banks' corporate
governance.
There are three reasons for stressing  bank privatization  as the final and most important  goal in
bank restructuring. First, recapitalization  of banks and transfer of ownership  to the private sector is
the only way of assuring an adequate  corporate structure, that is, the only way of assuring bankers'
credit decisions  are made independently  of their creditors' interests. This is the key for ensuring banks
take an active role in the transition. Private ownership  of capitW  generates a system of risks and
rewards that is the basis of the corporate  governance  structures found in market economies.
Second, a sufficient  number  of banks with an adequate  corporate governance  structure are
required to guarantee  a competitive  banking  system. This will ensure that bankers reward for lending is
linked to their ability to minimize  risk, and that they pay dearly for assuming  high risks. When thisPage 28
does not happen, the bad bankers will set the rules of the game and the good bankers will be pushed
out of competition." 6
Third, bank privatization  should influence  the design of the bank restructuring  strategy.
Because  the objective of any privatization  strategy is to maximize  the discounted  present value of the
assets subject to privatization,  the authorities  should  ensure that any investment  should be in line with
this principle. However, this is difficult  in the case of banks because the quality of the bank portfolio,
which is the most important  asset in a bank, can be subject to different  assessments  depending  on the
criteria used.  It is likely that bankers' opinions  differ in assessing  bank loans.  Because  the value of a
banks' assets is maximized  at the time of recapitalization,  it is argued  that the assessment  should occur
immediately  upon privatization.
Although  the five countries  have not been very successful  in privatizing  banks, some have
followed  altemative  strategies for enhancing  the banking  system corporate  governance. Interesting
examples  are the cases of Hungary and the CSFR.  Both countries  have tried to introduce market
discipline  in the banking  system by encouraging  the establishment  of banks with a stricter corporate
structure. Hungary did this by encouraging  the entry of foreign-owned  banks and the CSFR by
encouraging  both foreign and domestic-owned  banks. In Hungary the number  of joint-ventures
increased  from 2 in 1987 to 15 in 1991, and the number  of commercial  non-state-owned  banks
increased  from 2 in 1987 to 11 in 1991. In the CSFR between  January 1990 and March 1992, 34 new
banks were established.
Although  the strategy  had the expected  effect of enhancing  competition,  two problems  have
arisen. First, the new banks and, in particular, the foreign-owned  banks, as expected,  took advantage
of their better position and focused on the less risky activities  such as the foreign  trade financing
activities. Second, while a large number  of new banks were established  in both Hungary and the
I  Soo de Juan (1987)  for a vivid account of how goods banks can turn into bad in an environn ent subject to  noral hazards.Page  29
CSFR, they only accounted  for a small share of the market and could not swing the rules of the game
in favor of the good banks and impose  market discipline  on the bad banks. The large banks holding
most of the nonperforming  loans have dominated  bank competition. In addition, while this option has
been available  to Hungary, Poland and the CSFR, it might not be an option for Bulgaria and Romania
not to mention  some of the CIS countries  since they have received  less international  attention  and have
received  smaller foreign investment  flows.
E.  EFFICIENCY  OF BANKING  SYSTEMS:  AN ASSESSMENT  ATTEMPT
In assessing  the banks' performance,  I will focus on two types of evidence:  (a) trends in
domestic  credit allocation  by sector and, in particular, allocation  of credit to private sector enterprises;
and (b) trends in domestic  banks' real lending rates and interest rate spreads. This evidence  should
enable us to judge whether  domestic  banks have been allocating  credit efficiently  and whether  the
interest charged for these credits to the productive  sector have been competitive. As is well known, if
banks misallocate  credit and/or charge  high interest rates, they could  preempt the economic  recovery.
Because  the available information  is limited, the conclusions  should be taken as preliminary.
The available evidence  should enable us to make a preliminary assessment  of the role of banks in the
transition and to extract  some important  lessons. To limit the data quality problems, I have decided to
analyze  trends in these variables and to focus on Hungary, Poland and the CSFR, the countries  which
are more advanced  in restructuring  tlhir banking  system.
1. Credit Allocation
Using the available  information  on bank net domestic  credit, we can assess the role of banks in
the allocation  of credit.  Efficient  banks will try to diversify  their loan portfolio  by lending to new
good customers  and limiting  their lending to the old borrowers that have accumulated  arrears with
banks and account for most of banks' nonperforming  loans.  Moreover, it is possible to associate  thisPage 30
diversification  with the allocation  of credit between  private and SOEs.  An increasing  trend in bank
lending to private sector enterprises  should indicate that banks are trying to diversify, in particular,
because SOEs account for most of the stock of nonperforming  loans.  This does not mean that all SOEs
are nonviable enterprises,  but rather that as the private sector develops,  banks should be encouraged  to
lend to the potentially  profitable  private sector and therefore should target a larger proportion  of their
loans to them than to SOEs.
However, banks will respond to this behavior  depending  on the incentives they face ana the
ability to minimize  their own losses. For instance, if banks with nonperforming  loans dominate in the
market and they can by-pass  regulations  on required  provisions on nonperforming  loans, credit
resources will be misallocated.  Insolvent  banks holding  large nonperforming  loans might decide to
limit their provisions  on nonperforming  loans by granting new loans to their bad customers  as a way of
helping them to overcome  their difficulties  and turning them into good customers. Moreover, it could
also happen  that bankers behave as in the previous regime and grant credit to the old SOE customers
because they have no incentive  to diversify, or because  the government  compels  bankers to lend to
SOEs.  In any case, this will have the consequence  of crowding  out the good borrowers  from the
banking system and thus lead to a misallocation  of credit.
Evidence  for Hungary, Poland and the CSFR indicates  that banks, on average, have increased
their loans to the private sector very quickly  (see Graph 1).  However,  this growth in credit to the
private sector was less rapid than the growth in private sector activity. In Hungary, the proportion of
net domestic  credit allocated  to private sector enterprises  increased  from 0.6 percent of net domestic
credit and 2.2 of total enterprise credit in December  1988 to 3.3 and 8.3, respectively,  in December
1991. In Poland, bank credit to the private sector (which includes  households)  increased from 8.1
percent of net domestic  credit and 9.7 percent of total enterprise sector in March 1989  to 20 and 23Graph  1: Credit  Allocation  to the Private  Sector
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percent, respectively, in November  1991. In the CSFR, these ratios increased from 0 percent in
December 1988 to 5.6 and 6.1, respectively,  in November  1991.
Another source of evidence  for assessing  the role of banks in the allocation  of credit is the
proportion  of credit allocated  to the private sector by type of bank.  This information  is provided in
Graph 2 for Poland and the CSFR.  This graph shows the proportion  of credit allocated  to the private
sector by state-owned  banks and by private banks. This indicates  the extent to which bai'x  holding
nonperforming  loans, such as the state-owned  banks, have diversified  their lending.
Both in Poland and the CSFR, private banks have increased  their creiit to the private sector
faster than the state-owned  banks have. For instance, in Poland the private banks have increased  their
share of private sector loans from less than 5 percent in December 1989, to about 40 percent in
December 1991. In contrast, the state-owned  banks allocated  less than 10 percent of their total loans
to the private sector.  Similar conclusions  follow from the evidence  of CSFR's banks.  In December
1991  the non-state-owned  banks allocated more than 25 percent of their loans to the private sector, but
the large state-owned  banks only 5 percent.
2. Real Lending  Rates and Interest Rate Spreads
Comparing  Eastern European  banks' real lending  rates to those of German  and U.S. banks is
another way of assessing  Eastern European  banks' efficiency.  If efficient  banks dominate  in the market
and their commercial  risks are similar, their average  real lending will be comparable  to that of the
German  and U.S. banks adjusted  for devaluation  and risk factors. Efficient  domestic  banks will charge
a lending rate to their prime customers  more or less in line with the alternative  cost of finance, that is,
the international  lending rate. This will enable efficient  domestic  banks to attract low-risk  customers.
Differences  in the lending rate might prevail if the cost of attracting ueposits is higher in Eastern
Europe than in Germany  and the U.S.Graph  2: Allocation  of Credit  to the Private  Sector
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If domestic  banks have a larger proportion  of nonperforming  loans and are subject to high
reserve requirements,  they will have to charge a high lending rate and/or a large spread to compensate
the income  foregone. Since reserve requirements  on commercial  banks are relatively  low (except for
savings banks and banks in Hungary)  the costs of nonperforming  loans might be the most important
cost driving the lending rates and/or the interest rate spreads. These costs, however, will result in
high average lending rates (and/or low deposit  rates) and interest rate spreads, only if most banks hold
large nonperforming  loans.
The comparison  of the average real lending interest rates for each of the three Eastern
European countries  with those prevailing  in Germany  and the U.S., are shown in Graph 3.
Differences  in the real lending rates consist of changes  in real lending rates and in real exchange
rates." 7 The trends are illustrative  of banks' policies.
In all three countries  real lending  rates have increased  relative to international  levels. Real
lending rates increared very fast starting in 1991 and by end-1991  they were higher than those of
Germany  and the U.S.  This change in the real lending coincides  in most countries with policy
changes. In the case of Hungary the increase in the lending  rate in i991 coincided  with the
introduction  of new bank legislation  and the requirement  for provisions  on banks' nonperforming
loans.  Notice the large difference  between  Hungarian  banks' and German  banks' real lending rates in
1991, which was between  5 and 10 percentage  points.
In Poland the increase in real lending rates coincided  with the SOEs' crisis and the surge in
banks' nonperforming  loans. Polish banks' real lending rates were more than 15 percentage  points
higher than those of U.S. banks in 1991. This suggests  that Polish banks needed  to increase  their
revenue in order to compensate  for the interest forgone of nonperforming  loans.
"  To calculate  the rtal  lending  rates  and  the real  interest rate spreads  I have used the following  equation: {[(I  +i)*(l +E)/(I +p)J-l)*l00,  i
is  the nominial  lending  rate  or intrest rate spread of Gerrrany or the  U.S., E is the  devaluation  of the domestic  currency  against  the DM or
the USS and  p is  the annual  donestic  inflation.Graph  3: Real  Lending  Rates  of East.European  Countries,
Germany  and the U.S.  (In Percent  per Quarter)
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In the CSFR the increase  in real interest rates coincided  with the introduction  of bank
legislation  and the requirement  for loan loss provisions. Unlike Hungary and Poland, real lending
rates in the case of CSFR's banks remain similar to those of Germany  and the U.S.
Information  concerning  interest rate spreads is provided in Graph 4.  This graph shows the
decomposition  of CSFR's bank spreads by type of borrower and by type of bank.  It shows that
CSFR's banks charge their highest bpread  to private enterprises  and the lowest to the households  and
SOE sectors. In fact, it could be argued  that CSFR's banks supplemented  their income by expanding
credit to the private sector and charging, at the margin, the highest spread .
The differences  in interest rate spread by type of bank are also very revealing. In Graph 4 the
bank spread is broken down into the portion taken by a deposit-taking  bank, such as the Savings  Bank,
which lends its resources in the interbank  market, and the portion taken by nondeposit-taking  banks,
which borrow from the interbank  market. Most of the non-state  banks raise their funds by oorrowing
from the interbank  market because  they don't have a deposit  base.  This indicates  that the high spread
is explained  by the large state-owned  banks which need to generate  income to subsidize  their other
loans.
F. CONCLUSIONS:  ARE THERE ANY LESSONS?
In all five Eastern European countries, the governments  have undertaken  important  measures
for restructuring  their financial  qystems. The task was not an easy one, since all five countries
inherited a heavy legacy.  Banks in a centrally  planned economy  were designed  to play a role very
different from the one they have to play in a market economy. In centrally  planned economies,  banks
are passive institutions, and the transition to a market economy  requires  that  governments  turn banks
into active institutions  capable  of participating  in the economic  restructuring  effort.Graph  4: Decomposition  of CSF'R's  Nominal
Interest Rates  Spreads
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Although it is too early to assess the relative success  of each country, it is possible to suggest a
few elements  that can serve as lessons  from the reform so far.
First is the relation  between  the problem  of banks and those of enterprises. It is difficult  to
pretend to solve the banks' problems  without  confronting  simultaneously  the problems  of enterprises.
In the final analysis, the true problem is not whether  banks hold nonperforming  loans or not, but rather
how to prevent further accumulation  of nonperforming  loans.  This, in turn, implies that the real
problem lies in how to close the loss-making  and nonviable  enterprises.
Second is the role of banks in dealing with loss-making  and nonviable  enterprises. This is
difficult  because it is necessary  to grant bank managers  enough independence  from their customers,
loss-making  enterprises. The key question  is how fast a new bank governance  structure can be
introduced  which will grant bank managers  independence  in credit decisions. It is crucial  that banks
focus on what banks know best: assessing  risk.  Here the roles of capital, private ownership  and
adequate  regulation  and supervision  are crucial. In fact, the role assigned  to banks in the transition
will depend  on providing  banks with adequate  governance  structures. In this regard, few of the five
countries have been successful.
Third  is the role and timing of bank recapitalization. This is related to the corporate
governance. Bank recapitalization  only removes  the moral hazard  problem posed by the presence  of
nonperforming  loans.  In practice it consists  of an explicit acknowledgment  by the government  of the
old nonpe-forming  loans.  However,  this involves  an explicit guarantee.  The objectives  of a bank
recapitalizatRon  should be: (a) to prevent banks from acc.imulating  more nonperforming  loans, that is,
dealing with the enterprise problems;  and (b) to provide banks with a new corporate governance  that
will prevent them from incurring in new nonperforming  loans. This requires introducing  a system of
risk and reward by making  banks comply with the capital  adequacy  requirements,  privatizing a critical
number  of banks  and introducing  strong regulation  and supervision.Page 35
Fourth are the other roles of banks. The complexity  in untangling  the relation  between  banks'
and enterprises' problems  has led some governments  to overlook other important  roles that banks
should perform, such as providing  an efficient  payment systems.  The institutional  problems  that the
governments  have confronted  in introducing  efficient  payr  nnt  systems  underlines  the need to put
greater emphasis  on this task, since it is the basis for the development  of trust in the banking  system.
Fifth is the role of regulation  and supervision  in enhancing  banks' governance  structure. While
it appears to be an easy task, in practice it has proven to be difficult. Deciding  which regulation  and
supervision  to adopt implies knowing  what the role of banks should be. It is of no practical use for the
authorities  to enact a new banking  law with which most of the banks will be unable to comply.
There is also the problem of upgrading  the skills of bank supervisors. This requires
considerable  technical  assistance  and strong collaboration  from western countries. It requires time to
retrain bank supervisors capable  of efficient  on-site  and off-site bank supervision.
SWxth  is the presence of banks with a large proportion  of nonperforming  loans and which
account  for a large portion of the market. When  these are not controlled,  credit resources  are
misallocated. It is common  for these banks to grant more credit to borrowers  that have accumulated
nonperforming  loans and to increase the interest rate spreads. This usually  has negative  consequences
because good borrowers are either crowded-out  from the financial  system or have to pay a very high
interest rate.  Some countries  have tried to limit the extent of credit misallocation  by encouraging  the
entry of new banks. But because  the banks with nonperforming  loans dominated  in the market the new
banks have been unable to change  the large banks' behavior. Preliminary  evidence  suggests that the
new banks are more efficient  both in terms of credit allocation  and in terms of interest rate spreads.
This  evidence  strongly supports  the need to recapitalize  and privatize  a critical number  of
banks.  Moreover, it would be desirable to privatize  banks by selling a controlling  stake to a group of
private investors as a way of attracting  new capital (foreign  and domestic)  into the financial  system andPage  36
establishing  strong bank governance.  In fact, the combination  of  botk recapitalization  and privatization
of banks is optimal because  it ensures strong bank governance. The number  of banks to be
recapitalized  and privatized will depend  on such factors as reestablishing  market discipline  and
enhancing  bank compe.ition. Altho%,h  shrinking (by canceling  both nonperforming  and household
deposits 1') or removing  banks with large nonperforming  loans from the market will be optimal, in the
case it is not feasible strong domestic competition  by a critical number  of private banks with adequate
levels of capital should reestablish  the market discipline  and prevent large banks with nonperforming
loans from dominating  in the market.
The most important  conclusion  from the analysis  of the five Eastern European  countries'
experience  is that banks play a very important  role in the transition. However, all five countries  have
found it difficult  to rely on banks without  prior change in banks' corporate governance. This leads to
a key conclusion,  that the authorities  cannot rely at the early period of the transition on banks to exert
control on enterprises. In the early period the control  over SOEs should be exercised  through a
semipublic  institution  like the Treuhandanstalt  in East Germany,  the State Privatization  Agency in
Hungary or the National Property Fund in the CSFR.
There are three reasons for this: (a) banks are weak and do not posses the needed corporate
governance;  (b) banks do not posses all the legal instruments  to impose control on enterprises; and (c)
banks are not in a position  to take some key political  jiecisions  which only the government can make,
such as the proportion  of debt write-off  that each enterprise  should be granted, whether  or not to force
the liquidation  of large enterprises  which will result in great social  problems, or whether  or not banks
should grant loans to loss-making  enterprises. These are decisions  that only the govermnent  can make.
As the government  provides banks with an adequate  corporate governance  through
recapitalization,  privatization  and introduction  of new regulation  and supervision, the government  will
"  See Frydman  et &1(1992) for  an interesting explanation  for shrinking the existent large state-owned banksPage 37
be able to rely on banks to exert control over enterprises. Initially, banks' control over enterprises  has
to be indirect through credit allocation  and in close collaboration  with the semipublic  institution  in
charge of enterprise restructuring  and privatization.  Only when banks are provided with strong
corporate  governance will they be able to participate  directly in controlling  enterprises. Whether banks
direct control over enterprises  should be performed  by special investment  banks, like in Hungary and
CSFR, or by universal banks, like in Poland, Bulgalia  and Romania, will depend  on whether banks
with strong corporate governance  will emerge, assuring  banks' independence  in their credit decisions.
My personal preference  would be that during the transition only investment  banks should
specialize  in controlling  enterprises. This should limit the effect of ban-k  failure on the rest of the
financial  system and on d'jpositors,  while allowing  banks to contribute  to the development  of the
enterprise sector by permitting  them to take greater risks.  In a way this is the option taken by CSFR.
However, to be effective  this would need to be a scheme  for valuing enterprises  and their loans, such
as the voucher privatization  or by auctioning  the bad loans as I have  proposed elsewhere.' 9
However, it will be a mistake  to postpone the banking  system restructuring  because it takes
time.  The key conclusion  from the five Eastern Europeain  countries' experience  is that the role of
banks in the transition is of great importance,  but its effectiveness  will depend  on how soon the
authorities  start with banking  restructuring  and  how they sequence  it with the enterprise restructuring
and privatization.
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